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through informal institution-making?
The fifth European Parliament and
the EU High Representative
Ben Crum
ABSTRACT This article examines whether the European Parliament has been
able to use the institution of the High Representative as a lever to increase its
powers in the EU’s common foreign and security policy. Since it is found that the
EP’s strategy towards the HR has neither brought it any informal powers nor
been instrumental in forcing the proposal of an EU Foreign Minister, a formal inter-
governmentalist position appears to be vindicated. Yet from an institutionalist per-
spective it may be retorted that the few attainments of the EP so far are a consequence
of it having a far higher sensitivity to failure on CFSP-related issues than on well-
institutionalized European Community policies. As a future Foreign Minister will
be better able than the HR to secure some degree of political independence from
the Council, this may well lead the European Parliament to reassess its strategy
and to adopt a more assertive stance.
KEY WORDS Common foreign and security policy; European Parliament; EU
Constitution; EU High Representative; EU Minister for Foreign Affairs; informal
governance; institutional change.
INTRODUCTION
The powers of the European Parliament (EP) have steadily expanded in the
course of the series of European Treaty revisions of the past twenty years.
While originally assigned little more than a consultative role in the European
legislative process, in many domains Parliament has come to act as a full co-
legislator on a par with the Council of Ministers (cf. Farrell and He´ritier
2003). Similarly, Parliament’s right to be consulted on the choice of the Com-
mission President, as it was provided by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, has been
turned into an actual veto right (Hix 2002) and its powers to scrutinize the
members of the Commission have steadily increased.
The question is why such powers have been granted to the European Parlia-
ment. In fact, one would expect the European Union (EU) member govern-
ments, ‘the masters of the Treaties’, to have little interest in transferring
powers to a supranational institution as the European Parliament that they
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are unlikely to keep under their control. In seeking to account for the conces-
sions that have been made towards the European Parliament, recent research
has turned away from the ‘history-making’ formal moments of Treaty (re-)nego-
tiations to the day-to-day informal interactions between European organiz-
ational actors (JEPP 2003; Farrell and He´ritier 2003; Hix 2002). Coming
from different starting points, these authors highlight the incomplete character
of the formal Treaty provisions and the European Parliament’s distinctive ability
to exploit the loopholes that are left. Given its role in the decision-making
process and its willingness to instrumentalize substantive issues, the EP can
bring other European actors to concede certain ‘informal’ powers to it. What
is more, powers that are initially conceded informally can at a later stage be for-
malized in subsequent Treaty revisions.
Departing from these theories of informal institution-making in the EU, this
article examines whether the European Parliament has been able to use the insti-
tution of the High Representative (HR) that was established in the Treaty of
Amsterdam as a lever to increase its powers in the EU’s common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). For sure, the CFSP is a rather different policy
domain from the traditional European competences that are directly related
to the single market. At the same time, the precedents of Community
decision-making and the accountability of the Commission suggest that once
policies acquire a permanent Brussels extension, Parliament will try to exploit
it to increase its own leverage on the EU decision-making process. What is
more, the negotiations on a Constitutional Treaty foreshadow the abolition
of the HR by merging it with the position of Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs. This raises the question to what extent the EP has been instrumental
in this Treaty change and whether it stands to benefit from it.
Hence this article addresses two questions:
1 Has the European Parliament wrested any informal powers from its inter-
action with the HR?
2 Is the formal succession of the HR by a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs a
victory for the European Parliament?
Basically, this analysis seeks to apply the claims of recent theories of informal
institution-making between EU actors to the case of the relationship between
the EP and the HR. However, as it moves outside the domain of European
Community powers, this analysis also provides a critical test for these theories
that may help to specify their limits or, more specifically, the conditions
under which they apply.
With this aim in mind, the first section revisits the main findings of informal
institution-making in the EU so far and proposes to broaden the analytical
framework by complementing the predominant institutionalist approach with
two alternative perspectives. The second section introduces the case of the
relationship between the EP and the HR and sets up the hypotheses that
would follow from the three theoretical approaches. The remaining two sections
then examine the two questions posed on the basis of a systematic analysis of
384 Journal of European Public Policy
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documentation and EP reports concerning the EP-HR relationship, and inter-
views with representatives from both the Parliament and the Council secretariat.
1. THEORIES OF INFORMAL INSTITUTION-MAKING
Recent research has highlighted how European institutions are also developed
and transformed in the day-to-day interactions of European actors as they
evolve in between the ‘history-making’ Treaty revision moments. In contrast
to the formal institutions enshrined in the treaties and the legal acts directly
deriving from them, these institutions are called ‘informal institutions’ and
may be defined as ‘all the rules that lack both a formal foundation and third-
party oversight’ (Stacey and Rittberger 2003: 859). Informal institutions can
emerge due to the inherently incomplete character of the formal rules of the
European Treaties. They arise when actors confront situations to which the
formal rules do not provide an unequivocal response.
Of particular interest are those situations that bear upon the relationships
between EU organizational actors, most notably the Council, the Commission
and the Parliament, and where their respective organizational interests suggest
conflicting interpretations of the appropriate line of action. While such conflicts
may be resolved on a case-by-case basis, when similar situations keep recurring
and none of the actors involved can simply impose its view unilaterally, they
may allow for the emergence of informal institutions to ease the handling of
these situations. Actors that have not been fully involved in the creation of
the formal Treaty rules (like the European Parliament) and regard them as
unsatisfactory have a distinctive interest in seeking to exploit such equivocal
situations against actors that have co-authored the formal rules (like the member
governments in the Council) (Rittberger and Stacey 2003: 1027).
Accounts so far broadly agree on the factors that determine the ability of
actors to shape informal institutions. Hix (2002: 271) focuses on the European
Parliament’s credible threat to the Council of non-co-operation that is based
on its willingness ‘to lose in the short term in return for [formal and informal]
constitutional reforms that guarantee its interests in the long term’. Outlining
a somewhat more extensive theoretical framework, Farrell and He´ritier
(2003) list the EP’s willingness to instrumentalize substantive issues and its
low sensitivity to failure besides three other factors: the formal institutional
framework, differing time horizons, and differing levels of resources. Notably,
they find that – apart from the formal institutional framework – these
factors generally tend to work in favour of the European Parliament’s bargaining
position in upholding its preferred informal arrangements.
Perspectives diverge somewhat when it comes to the relation between infor-
mal and formal institutions. Hix (2002) argues that EU governments may
formalize informal institutions if – given the operation of the informal
institution – they no longer involve a de facto shift of power and if the govern-
ments recognize collective benefits in terms of efficiency, simplicity, trans-
parency and legitimacy in formalizing these changes. Stacey and Rittberger
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(2003) and Farrell and He´ritier (2003) move beyond Hix’s position by under-
lining the iterative, recursive character of institutional interactions. They argue
that the iterative character of institutional interactions greatly influences actors’
assessments of the costs and benefits of committing to certain formal or informal
institutions. What is more, any formalization of previously informal institutions
does not necessarily conclude the process of informal institution-building but
may rather open up new prospects for it.
Notably, all these accounts of informal institution-making rely heavily on insti-
tutionalist analysis, more specifically of the historical kind (cf. Hall and Taylor
1996). Regardless of the different emphases, the unifying institutionalist argu-
ment underlying all of them may be summarized in the following five theses:
1 Faced with indeterminacies in the formal Treaties, actors mobilize different
resources to impose their preferred interpretation.
2 From the confrontation of the different cost–benefit functions of the actors,
an equilibrium solution emerges.
3 Through iterative interactions over time, the actors involved may come to
recognize this solution as an informal institution given the general merits
of increasing the efficiency and transparency of their interactions.
4 Informal institutions may even be formalized once the de facto disadvantages
of formalization become negligible.
5 With the adoption of new or amended formal institutions, the parameters for
informal institution-making are changed rather than that the process is
closed.
Underlying this theoretical model is the assumption that EU governments,
given their substantive goals, will be willing to concede (informally and for-
mally) procedural powers to supranational institutions if the efficiency and
transparency of working towards their goals will be greater than if these conces-
sions are not made.
Given the similarities among the different accounts thus far, there has been
little systematic testing of this institutionalist theory against alternative expla-
nations. Stacey and Rittberger (2003) contrast different institutionalist
accounts, but their hypotheses derive mainly from their preferred position of
‘rational choice historical institutionalism’ (RCHI). To discriminate more
clearly between alternative explanations, the institutionalist account can be con-
trasted with two alternative approaches to informal institutions in the EU.
The first of these we may label intergovernmental formalism. This perspective
insists on the primacy of the formal Treaty texts and of the EU governments as
its masters. In this light the indeterminacy of the formal treaties appears of little
relevance, as do informal institutions. To the extent that informal institutions
emerge, they are expected to remain firmly bound by the letter and the spirit
of the formal Treaty texts, and thus to remain safely under the control of the
EU governments.
As a second alternative to the institutionalist approach, one can outline a con-
structivist position (cf. Checkel 1999). Rather than going along with the inter-
386 Journal of European Public Policy
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governmentalist assumption that the actors’ preference functions are basically
fixed, constructivists argue that the way actors define their interests and how
they project them may well be transformed in the course of the integration
process. Informal institutions can be rather well accommodated in this perspec-
tive. In particular this perspective throws a different light on those instances
where the European Parliament succeeds in getting other actors to accept its
preferred interpretation of the inter-institutional rules. Whereas the mainstream
institutionalist explanations seek to account for this in terms of efficiency gains
within a given cost–benefit calculus, the constructivist perspective suggests that
the other actors may in fact be persuaded to recognize the Parliament’s claims to
democratic legitimacy.
Thus set up, these three perspectives are really ideal-types (Table 1). As is also
illustrated by the research on informal institutions so far, most empirical analyses
will mix elements from all three approaches. Thus, by employing rational choice
elements, Hix and Stacey and Rittberger (but less so Farrell and He´ritier) in a
way try to reconcile their institutionalist approach with some basic insights
from intergovernmental formalism. Stacey and Rittberger also acknowledge
the value that more constructivist (or ‘sociological institutionalist’) explanations
may have, even though they choose to treat these as only secondary to institu-
tionalist and rational choice explanations. As the three perspectives can thus
to some extent coexist, the theoretical challenge becomes to specify the empirical
conditions under which each perspective will prevail.
2. THE CASE OF EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CFSP
The relationship between the High Representative for the CFSP and the Euro-
pean Parliament is a rather distinctive setting within the European institutional
architecture. For a start, there is the particular saliency of the domain in which
the HR operates, namely the common foreign and security policy. The CFSP is
generally distinguished from the traditional areas of European co-operation as a
domain of distinctively ‘high politics’. As a consequence, co-operation in this
domain has been slow to evolve and has remained tied to particularly demand-
ing procedures. The case of the HR thus allows us to explore the CFSP domain
in contrast to earlier studies of informal institution-making that have looked
mostly at the more institutionalized Community competences.
A further singularity of foreign policy is that it is administered mostly through
executive decisions rather than through legal acts. In many ways the most
notable example of informal institution-making and its subsequent formaliza-
tion is probably the way Parliament has been able to extend its powers to
hold the European Commission accountable (Hix 2002). The question then
arises whether the EP will be able to employ a similar strategy with regard to
the (pseudo-)executive institution of the HR. In fact, since acquiring legislative
powers in this domain is of rather limited relevance, maintaining certain controls
over the HR constitutes the most important inroad the EP has on the CFSP.
B. Crum: Parliamentarization of the CFSP 387
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From the three theoretical perspectives outlined, different hypotheses may be
derived with regard to each of the two questions posed in this article:
1 Has the European Parliament wrested any informal powers from its inter-
action with the HR?
2 Is the formal succession of the HR by a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs a
victory for the European Parliament?
Table 1 Three alternative approaches to informal institution-making in the EU
Institutionalism
Intergovernmental
formalism Constructivism
States’
preference
function
Fixed, but open to
changes in the
parameters
Fixed Malleable
Mechanism of
political
dynamics
(Incremental)
reduction of
inefficiencies
New optimal
solutions and
changes in
negotiation setting
Learning and
socialization
Emergence of
informal
institutions
Exploitation of
indeterminacies in
Treaty texts
Epiphenomenon to
clarify Treaty texts
Accommodation
and
transformation of
formal provisions
to actual practice
Main
resources to
shape
informal
institutions
Blocking power
and sensitivity to
failure
Control over
Treaty texts
Persuading power
backed up by
appeals to public
legitimacy
Formalization
of informal
institutions
Possible when de
facto impact
becomes
negligible and
efficiency and
transparency gains
can be secured
Unlikely Likely as a way of
enshrining new
insights
Relevance of
informal
institutions
for the
process of
European
integration
Conditional Negligible Symptomatic
Cf. Stacey and Rittberger (2003: 869, Table 1).
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Intergovernmental formalism
The predictions of the perspective of intergovernmental formalism are premised
on the formal Treaty provisions. The Treaty of Amsterdam positioned the HR
as an administrative agent of the Council. Paragraph 18.3 TEU assigns the func-
tion of HR to the Secretary-General of the Council secretariat. Article 26 then
provides that the HR
shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common
foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formu-
lation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appro-
priate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency,
through conducting political dialogue with third parties.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam reaffirmed the intergovernmental
character of the CFSP as a separate pillar besides the European Community
(Monar 1997). The CFSP is carried out by the EU member states acting
together through the European Council and the Council. Contrary to
decision-making concerning, for instance, the internal market, decisions in
the CFSP generally require unanimity among the member states. As a conse-
quence, it falls upon the national parliaments to ensure democratic control of
the CFSP by scrutinizing the positions taken by their governments.
As a complement to this, the EP is assigned no more than a marginal role in
the CFSP. Article 21 TEU provides that Parliament shall be informed and con-
sulted by the EU Presidency on the basic choices and the progress in the CFSP.
Parliament further has the rights to ask questions and to make recommendations
to the Council. All in all, the EP is acknowledged in the CFSP and allowed the
right to express its views but it is not given any genuine powers. Thus it is in the
end little more than a matter of courtesy if the Presidency and the HR involve
the Parliament in the CFSP. Hence, we can define hypothesis F1 as follows:
F1: The interaction between the EP and the HR will not lead to the concession of
any informal powers to the European Parliament.
As no significant informal institutions are likely to emerge, there is little reason
to expect that the EP’s strategy towards the HR will successfully translate into
subsequent formal Treaty revisions. In fact, in line with the insistence on the
role of the member governments as the masters of the Treaties, the intergovern-
mental formalist position also suggests a negative hypothesis to the second ques-
tion:
F2: The proposal of a EU Foreign Minister cannot be attributed to the successful
intervention of the EP.
Instead Treaty (re-)negotiations will be determined by the preferences of the EU
governments as they always are.
B. Crum: Parliamentarization of the CFSP 389
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Institutionalism
Alternatively, the institutionalist perspective would allow for the possibility of
informal institutions developing between the High Representative and the
European Parliament. Of course, institutionalists recognize that the formal
institutional framework grants the EP very little power in the sphere of the
CFSP and no formal claims on the HR whatsoever. However, there are two
openings in the formal framework that the EP may seek to exploit in reshaping
its relationship with the HR: the EP’s budgetary power and the importance of
ensuring consistency in the EU’s institutions’ actions towards the outside
world.
The HR relies on the European Community budget, which is prepared each
year by the Commission and adopted by the Parliament together with the
Council (Art. 28 TEU; cf. Missiroli 2003). Over time a special CFSP chapter
has been inserted in the budget for the financing of CFSP actions that do not
have military or defence implications. However, the costs of any substantial
(crisis) action easily exceed the limited size of the CFSP budget (E62.6
million in 2004) and thus require additional funding being made available on
an ad hoc basis. While in principle member states can provide the budget for
missions by sharing the costs between them, the more practicable alternative
is to finance non-military CFSP actions by re-allocating money from the Com-
munity’s budget for External Action that, with an overall size of E5 billion
yearly, provides considerable leeway. This is where Parliament comes in, since
such re-allocations require its approval, which it may use to wrest concessions.
The other potential lever the EP has on the CFSP is by taking initiatives that
undermine the unity of the stance of the EU vis-a`-vis third countries. In general,
its lack of formal powers does not keep the EP from taking a stance on issues of
world politics, and the majority of Parliament is generally inclined to adopt a
rather principled stance, in contrast to the more diplomatic approach of the
HR. More specifically the EP can fuel its political opinions by withholding
its approval to international agreements of the European Community with
third countries and thus preventing them from entering into force.1 As Parlia-
ment is thus able to jeopardize diplomatic initiatives, the HR has an interest in
maintaining a good relationship with it so as to induce it to behave ‘responsibly’;
even though Parliament’s concrete powers are limited, it can potentially act as a
major ‘nuisance factor’.2
To sum up, with regard to the possible emergence of informal institutions
between the HR and the EP, the institutionalist perspective hypothesizes:
I1: The HR will concede informal powers to the EP only to the extent that it has the
ability to frustrate CFSP initiatives.
What is more, we have seen that from an institutionalist perspective it is in fact
conceivable that by securing informal institutions the EP can even exert its
power over formal Treaty negotiations in which these informal institutions
390 Journal of European Public Policy
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can become formalized. Thus with regard to the second question the institution-
alist position suggests that:
I2: To the extent that informal institutions have developed between the EP and the
HR, they will be incorporated into the proposal of an EU Foreign Minister if
their formalization constitutes an improvement in terms of efficiency and trans-
parency without, however, amounting to any significant de facto power losses of
the member states.
The conditions indicated here reflect the conditions that have been identified in
the earlier research on informal institution-making.
Constructivism
One thing that catches the eye from a constructivist perspective is that the HR,
regardless of his formal positioning as an agent of the Council, represents the
first full-time personal political embodiment of the CFSP in Brussels. Much
more than the diplomatic delegations of the member states, the HR is thus
part of ‘the Brussels complex’ and involved in daily, formal and informal, inter-
actions with the supranational institutions of the Commission and the Parlia-
ment. In particular in his interactions with the Parliament, the HR will be
exposed to its claims to democratic legitimacy for it being the only directly
representative institution at the European level. Over time, the constructivist
perspective would expect the HR to position itself increasingly beyond the
sphere of control of the Council and simultaneously to gradually concede to
claims of the Parliament to hold him accountable:
C1: The HR will come to concede informal powers to the EP as a natural conse-
quence of their regular interaction.
Furthermore, when it comes to the formalization of informal institutions, con-
structivists will argue that relationships that have emerged informally in daily
practice will indeed inform formal revisions. However, contrary to the institu-
tionalist perspective, constructivists would suggest that these formal changes
result not from an assessment by the masters of the Treaty of the costs of EP
non-co-operation but rather from them coming to recognize its legitimate
role in the European decision-making process.
C2: The proposal of a EU Foreign Minister will incorporate the informal practices
that have emerged in the day-to-day interaction between the HR and the EP so
as to formally validate their legitimacy.
Thus this section issues two sets of three competing hypotheses that may be
tested in the light of the actual events as they have taken place since the establish-
ment of the HR in 1999. Basically, the formal intergovernmentalist position
B. Crum: Parliamentarization of the CFSP 391
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does not allow for the EP to acquire any informal powers as a result of the
establishment of the HR, let alone for the formalization of such powers. The
constructivist position, on the contrary, suggests that it is only all too likely
that the interaction between the EP and the HR will provide the former with
new, informal powers that will also lay the basis for new, formal powers. The
institutionalist perspective takes the middle ground by tying the acquirement
of informal powers by the EP, as well as their subsequent formalization, to
some rather specific conditions.
3. HAS THE 1999 TO 2004 EP WRESTED ANY INFORMAL
POWERS FROM ITS INTERACTION WITH THE HR?
Having initially opposed the establishment of the High Representative, insisting
that his duties were better entrusted to an External Action Commissioner, once
the Treaty of Amsterdam had been agreed, the European Parliament started to
prepare for the first HR even before he was appointed. Parliament raised a
number of claims seeking to acquire informal powers vis-a`-vis the HR that
were not recognized as such in the Treaty. These claims concerned, respectively,
the appointment procedure of the HR, the formal interaction between the HR
and Parliament, and the substantive involvement of the EP in CFSP policy-
making.
Appointment procedure
As was widely recognized, the HR’s role was ‘likely to be very much defined by
the first individual to hold the post’ (Peterson and Sjursen 1998: 176; cf. Monar
1997: 425). Even if the Treaty did not provide any role for it in the appointment
procedure, Parliament clearly communicated its preference. It called for the
appointment of ‘an eminent person with a clear political profile’, adding that
‘the High Representative should be a politician, rather than an administrator’
(EP 1999a: 7, 9). Shortly before the first HR was to be appointed, Parliament
became more specific as it ‘insists on a confirmation hearing of the Foreign
Affairs Committee prior to the take up of formal duties of the High Represen-
tative; considers such a confirmation hearing as a precondition for developing a
close and constructive relationship between Parliament and the High Represen-
tative’ (EP 1999b: 10). Parliament even amended its rules of procedures (Rule
99) for this purpose.
However, Parliament’s bluff was quickly called. Even if the decision of the
European Council of June 1999 to designate Javier Solana as the first High
Representative met the EP’s wish for ‘an eminent person with a clear political
profile’, there was not a single gesture by which the European Council or
Solana himself recognized any role for Parliament in the appointment pro-
cedure. Parliament’s offer to lend its endorsement to the appointment was not
taken up. As the parliamentarians were themselves occupied with their election
campaigns, no effort was made to press for the idea of a confirmation hearing.
392 Journal of European Public Policy
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Formal interaction
Shortly before Solana entered office, Parliament set out its ideas for the formal
interaction with the High Representative. Departing from the premise that ‘the
future High Representative will develop a permanent and structured working
relationship with Parliament’, it stipulated that the HR ‘will inform [the Euro-
pean Parliament] at least on a quarterly basis on topical issues of the CFSP’
(EP 1999b: 10). As to the format of these interactions, Parliament indicates
that its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) is to play a vital role (EP
1999b: 15). Moreover, the EP suggests holding ‘an EP External Relations
“Plenary” . . . after meetings of the General Affairs Council that would allow
a more open and continuous dialogue with Council by all committees of Par-
liament concerned with external relations’ (EP 1999b: 19). Thus Parliament
seeks to establish a clear position for itself within the CFSP policy routines
by using the HR as a go-between.
As it turned out, from his appointment until the dissolution of the fifth Euro-
pean Parliament in June 2004, Solana attended on average four or five EP meet-
ings a year (see Table 2). Thus he appears to have honoured Parliament’s claim
to meet on a quarterly basis. However, some qualifications are in order before
inferring that an informal institution has been established. Parliament is keen
for Solana to attend its meetings and thus basically extends an open invitation
to him. On the other side, Solana’s office is also committed to maintaining some
kind of frequency, if only to prevent the emergence of bad blood on the side of
Parliament at (crisis) moments where it would be least desirable.3 Still, his actual
coming to Parliament is one obligation that has to compete with many others
(often (far) beyond Brussels and Strasbourg) that often prevent him from
being available. Thus, in practice, it is very much Solana who determines the
Table 2 Presence of the HR at sessions of the fifth European Parliament (1999–
2004)
Year
Number of meetings
(Plenary/AFET(þ)
Committee) Main topics addressed
1999 (Autumn) 2 (1/1) General introduction
2000 4 (1/3) Western Balkans, ESDP
2001 5 (2/3) Western Balkans (Macedonia),
Middle East, 9/11
2002 5 (4/1) Middle East, Western Balkans,
Afghanistan
2003 4 (3/1) Middle East, European Security
Strategy, Iraq, Western Balkans
2004 (first half) –
Total 20 (11/9)
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pace of their formal interactions with his office checking his availability against
the pre-scheduled meetings of the EP.
Parliament’s initial suggestion of ‘an EP External Relations “Plenary”’ never
really materialized. Twice, however, the meetings have taken the extraordinary
format of a joint meeting of the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee together with
the committees on foreign affairs and defence policy of the EU national parlia-
ments: once to discuss the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe (September 2001)
and once to discuss the European Security Strategy (September 2003). Notably,
by adopting this format, Parliament acknowledges the distinctively intergovern-
mental character of the CFSP, while at the same time underlining the need for
complementarity between parliamentary controls at the national and the Euro-
pean level.
In light of the earlier remarks of Parliament underlining the pivotal role of its
Foreign Affairs Committee in monitoring the HR, actual practice displays a
notable shift from HR attendance of the committee to the EP plenary. This
shift may be accounted for by the banal reason of scheduling problems.4
However, there are notable differences between the two settings. Exchanges in
the EP plenary tend to be rather ritualistic and contain few surprises. Typically,
Solana will start with an introductory statement, and in the subsequent ques-
tions and answers session the presidents of the political groups get to take the
lead. By contrast, the Foreign Affairs Committee puts its meetings with
the HR on its agenda as an ‘exchange of views’ (pursuant to Article 103 of
the EP’s Rules of Procedure). While Solana also tends to open the session on
these occasions, the smaller size and the higher degree of expertise of the mem-
bership allow for a more penetrating debate.
All in all, then, it appears that Solana has the upper hand in deciding when to
see Parliament and in setting the agenda of their interactions. Parliament has
acquired little to no control in determining the format of the encounters, or
in setting their substantive focus. True to the expectations of intergovernmental
formalism, the HR’s relations with the EP appear more motivated by a sense of
courtesy than by a sense of obligation. One further point to be noted in this
context is that Solana has a distinct preference to use informal meetings to
brief parliamentarians on the more controversial issues, since political consider-
ations often prevent him from being too outspoken in public.5 Thus he holds
regular informal exchanges with the EP President, the Presidents of the party
groups and the political co-ordinators in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Parlia-
mentarians are generally happy to oblige on such informal occasions, even if
they realize that these encounters are of limited political use and may actually
undermine the effectiveness of formal exchanges.6
Substantive policy involvement of the EP
As concerns its substantive involvement, Parliament’s vision is well captured by
its claim, submitted in 1998, to an ‘oversight function’ vis-a`-vis the High Repre-
sentative ‘which would enhance democratic control of and popular support for
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the CFSP’ (EP 1998: 11). From his side, Solana expressed his views in his first
address to the EP plenary:
It is of course important that I keep you informed about what I am doing and
the initiatives I take. Equally necessary is for me to hear your opinions and
views. The people expect us to react swiftly and effectively in the event of a
crisis, and rightly expect their concerns to be taken into account. As democra-
tically elected representatives, you have a key role to play in reflecting these
views and in contributing to the development of a common foreign and secur-
ity policy, which is more effective, more coherent and closer to the concerns of
citizens and which reflects the values and principles which have forged our
identity as Europeans.
(Solana 1999)
Notably, Solana acknowledges Parliament’s distinctive role in representing the
people’s expectations. However, rather than allowing Parliament any normative
claim over his actions, he presents their relationship as one of equals with a
mutual interest in keeping each other fully informed about their actions and
views. In fact, all niceties apart, the bottom line of Solana’s stance is ‘to keep
the EP happy but also distant’.7
EP–HR interaction in the period 1999 to 2004 was dominated by two
topics. First, there was the situation in the Western Balkans, in particular the
attempt to contain the crisis in Macedonia that erupted in March 2001.
Then from 2002 onwards, the ongoing crisis in the Middle East came to the
fore and in particular the drafting of the ‘Roadmap’ to a solution of the
Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in which Solana was involved as the EU represen-
tative. Besides these two main topics, the HR and the EP exchanged views
over wider strategic issues, such as the development of the European Security
and Defence Policy and the European Security Strategy that was drafted in
2003. Then, of course, the HR and EP could not ignore the international
agenda after 9/11. However, apart from a swift initial response, disagreements
among the EU governments prevented Solana from taking much initiative in
the following debates concerning Afghanistan and Iraq (Hill 2004).
Generally, Parliament has come to look with much appreciation at Solana’s
initiatives and his ability to develop his office. In the EP’s 2001 Progress Report
of the CFSP, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Elmar Brok observes ‘that,
perhaps for the first time in the history of the CFSP, an EU foreign and security
concept, which can be summed up by the terms “conflict prevention and crisis
management” and is founded on the common political will to act at the oper-
ational level, is visibly in evidence’ (EP 2001: 12).
However, there have also been some differences in orientation between Par-
liament and Solana. Following the institutionalist line of argument, we should
focus in particular on issues where Parliament can credibly threaten to frustrate
the HR’s initiatives. Such potential is, for instance, present in Parliament’s more
forthcoming attitude towards Taiwan that sometimes threatens to complicate
the Council’s ambitions to improve relations with the People’s Republic of
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China (cf. Lan 2004), and in Parliament’s wilful neglect of the Co-operation
Agreement that the Commission agreed in 2001 with the Pakistani government
and which Solana would like to have ratified. Typically, however, Solana has
carefully avoided playing these disagreements out in any outright confrontation
with Parliament. To the extent that it is found desirable to put pressure on Par-
liament, Solana tends to rely on his staff in the Council secretariat and on infor-
mal contacts between Council members and their national MEPs. Similar
practices are used on those occasions when the EP’s Budget Committee has
challenged budget reappropriation requests from the Council for the sake of
financing CFSP actions. Lobbying through the presidency of the Budget Com-
mittee, the HR’s office has generally succeeded in overcoming such resistance
and prevented a direct confrontation between the HR and Parliament.
Overall there is little evidence that Parliament has been able to sway the HR’s
policy on any particular issue. In the light of its informal potential highlighted
by the institutionalist perspective, Parliament has clearly renounced pulling its
full political weight. The main reason for this lies in the way MEPs assess the
potential costs of non-co-operation in the domain of the CFSP. Consider,
for example, what both Council secretariat and the EP recognize as the
‘nuclear option’: if the EP were to publicly retract its confidence in the HR
by adopting a resolution to that effect, both sides recognize that it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, for the HR to stay in office, even if formally
no effect needs to be attached to such a resolution. From an institutionalist per-
spective one would expect Parliament to use this option as a veiled threat when-
ever it runs into conflict with the HR. Two reasons explain why this is not the
case however. First, the ‘nuclear option’ only becomes a credible threat if Par-
liament can make a genuine case for the HR falling short and so far Solana has
managed to steer clear of any such situation. The crux of the matter lies,
however, in Parliament’s high sensitivity to failure in that by voting the HR
down it might well vote down the most promising instrument for seeing a
CFSP emerge altogether. Even if the HR is positioned outside the Community
structure, Parliament recognizes him as representing the most supranational
element of the CFSP. Challenging the HR’s position may well provoke the
retraction of all supranational elements of the CFSP by the Council, leaving
little to nothing for the EP in this domain.
Thus also in terms of substantive engagement the fifth European Parliament
has not succeeded in acquiring any informal powers. Instead the HR’s office
has been quite successful in its intention ‘to keep the EP happy but also
distant’.8 It has strictly limited Parliament’s incursions and avoided any politi-
cal confrontation. At the same time, members of the EP have acquiesced in
having the HR operate at a certain distance, even if they recognize that ‘the
relationship with the HR has lacked in coherence and completeness’.9
Clearly, the limited formal powers of the EP to oblige the HR do impose a
handicap. Ultimately, however, it is Parliament’s distinct sensitivity to losing
the few inroads into the CFSP that the HR provides it with, which it also
considers to be the most important stepping stone towards a more mature
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and parliamentarized CFSP, which explains why it has not wrested any sub-
stantial concessions from him.
4. IS THE EU FOREIGN MINISTER A VICTORY FOR THE EP?
As we find that the fifth European Parliament has acquired little to no informal
powers vis-a`-vis the High Representative, there would appear to be little point
in examining whether the informal interaction between these two institutions
has fed into the reform of the HR in the proposed EU Constitutional
Treaty. However, the Constitutional Treaty suggests quite a fundamental over-
haul in which the function of the HR is replaced by the new institution of a
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The question may still be asked to what
extent this reform has been informed by the misgivings of the EP with the
HR. An additional question is whether, in the light of the experience with
the HR, these reforms affect some parameters that may indeed make the
future evolution of informal institutions between the EP and the Foreign Min-
ister more likely.
Throughout the institutional debates from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the
Constitutional Treaty, the European Parliament has consistently called for
the communautarization of the CFSP by merging the HR with the Commission
(cf. EP 2000). Yet, when faced with the figure of the HR, Parliament has sig-
nalled some willingness to recognize the distinctive character of the CFSP:
‘[t]here can be no doubt that the cohesiveness of the system demands that the
High Representative “return to port” i.e., be part of the Commission,
whether as its President or as Vice-President in charge of coordinating inter-
national action under a special procedure for his appointment and his answerability
to the European Council’ (EP 1999a: 16, emphasis added).
The proposal of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs that was included in the
proposed EU Constitutional Treaty (Article 28) foresees indeed that the execu-
tive responsibilities for the Union’s external action will be concentrated in a
single person. Notably, however, this Foreign Minister is to operate under
two decision-making regimes: in the field of CFSP/ESDP his or her activities
will fall under a mandate of the Council, while activities within the external
action competences will be exercised under the principle of collegiality pertain-
ing to the Commission (in which the Minister will indeed serve as a Vice-
President).
The main contours of this ‘double-hatted’ Foreign Minister were drawn by
the Working Group on External Action of the European Convention that
paved the way for the Constitutional Treaty. Contrary to what the constructivist
perspective suggests, the proposals of this Working Group were not informed by
the actual experiences with the HR. The proposal of a double-hatted EU Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs rather emerged as a political compromise between, on
the one hand, those (some prominent government representatives, most
notably from the UK, Sweden and Spain) who wanted to keep the two positions
separate and, on the other hand, a large group of European and national
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parliamentarians plus some odd government representatives (e.g. Finland) who
advocated the full merger of the HR with the Commission.
Notably, the introduction of the EU Foreign Minister is not accompanied by
any substantial revision of the EP’s role in the CFSP. In fact, the Convention
Working Group on External Action concluded that the current powers of the
EP in the CFSP ‘were satisfactory’. Notwithstanding the request of many
MEPs, the EP is not given a right of assent to the appointment of the
Foreign Minister. The Minister shall be appointed by the European Council
acting by qualified majority and with the agreement of the President of the
Commission. However, Parliament does get an indirect say in the appointment
procedure as the Foreign Minister is included among the nominees for the
College of Commissioners, which as a whole needs to pass a vote of consent
of Parliament (Art. I-27.2). To the extent that the Foreign Minister acts as a
member of the Commission, his actions are implicated in all general Commis-
sion obligations vis-a`-vis the European Parliament (Art. I-26.8). However, to
the extent that the Foreign Minister acts within the competences of the
CFSP, the powers of the EP are significantly more limited. Most notably,
while a censure vote of the Commission as a whole will imply the resignation
of the Foreign Minister in his or her duties as a Commissioner, he or she will
remain in charge of the tasks outside the Commission’s domain.
Uncertainties about the workability of the inherently ambiguous double-
hatted position are widespread. National representatives have expressed fears
that it opens the door for the Commission (and the EP in its slipstream) to
interfere with the Council’s responsibility over the CFSP. Also on the side of
the EP it is appreciated that it will not always be self-evident in practice how
to delineate the CFSP and the Community competences from each other.
While this may indeed create openings for the EP, there is also the fear that
the Foreign Minister may use this ambiguity to roll back the powers that Parlia-
ment currently enjoys with regard to the external competences of the Commis-
sion.10
In the end, the introduction of the Foreign Minister changes little to the
basic logic in which the EP relies on the HR/Foreign Minister for its involve-
ment in the CFSP rather than the other way around. Hence, the implications
of the change from HR to Foreign Minister for the emergence of informal
institutions in this domain should not be overestimated. However, more so
than the HR, the Foreign Minister, especially due to his responsibilities and
instruments within the Commission, will be able to move outside the Coun-
cil’s sphere of control and may even have an interest in asserting his or her
autonomy. Indeed, as one Council official observes: ‘the overall logic of the
draft Constitutional Treaty is that the Foreign Minister and his office, rather
than towards the Council, will in the long run lean towards the Commis-
sion.’11 If the Foreign Minister will effectively secure some degree of political
independence from the Council, this may well lead the European Parliament to
reassess its strategic options and to adopt a more assertive stance in their
relationship.
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CONCLUSION
There is little evidence that the European Parliament has been able to use the
institution of the High Representative as a lever to increase its powers in the
common foreign and security policy. Despite its intentions, the fifth European
Parliament has failed to wrest any substantial informal powers from the HR.
Council and HR have refused Parliament any role in the HR’s appointment.
Parliament and the HR have come to meet on a rather regular basis, but the
initiative in these contacts is firmly on the side of the HR who has prevented
the development of any procedural rights on the side of the EP. Also in substan-
tive terms, Parliament has been unable to gather any influence in the CFSP
beyond its formal right to remain regularly informed.
Prima facie this state of affairs may be considered as a vindication of the
formal intergovernmental position which predicts that no informal institutions
are to emerge between the EP and the HR. While there is no support whatsoever
for the constructivist hypothesis that EP–HR interaction leads naturally to
informal institutions between them, the analysis does suggest an important qua-
lification by which the institutionalist perspective can be salvaged. In contrast to
the well-institutionalized European Community policies, the EP’s sensitivity to
failure is much higher in the CFSP. Parliament recognizes the HR as its best bet
for seeing a CFSP develop and in due course acquiring parliamentary influence
over it. Imposing parliamentary pressure on the HR risks the retraction of all
supranational elements of the CFSP by the Council.
On the second question – whether the formal succession of the HR by a Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs is a victory for the European Parliament – the intergo-
vernmental formalist explanation clearly prevails, as the actual interaction between
EP and HR has played no role in the conception of the Foreign Minister proposal.
There are however two qualifications. First, contrary to earlier Treaty revisions, the
drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, including the provisions on the Foreign Min-
ister, was not a wholly intergovernmental affair. As the European Convention
allowed a prominent role to parliamentarians in the drafting of the Constitutional
Treaty, the Foreign Minister proposal emerged as a political compromise between
Parliament’s preferred option of full communautarization of the HR’s responsibil-
ities and the adherents of the existing situation. Second, regardless of its origins, the
proposal of a double-hatted Foreign Minister carries many indeterminacies with it.
Given that, compared to the HR, the Foreign Minister emerges much more as a
political figure of its own with considerably more status and resources, and given
the EP’s proven ability to wrest concessions, the EP may well be able to exploit
the indeterminacies to its advantage.
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NOTES
1 At least if they establish a special institutional framework, have important budgetary
implications or involve competences where the EP enjoys full legislative powers
(Art. 300.4 ECT).
2 As put by an official in the Council secretariat, interview, 30 July 2003.
3 Interview with senior official of the Council Legal Service, 27 August 2003.
4 As is indeed suggested by people in the Council secretariat and conceded by people
in the EP.
5 Interviews with senior officials of the Council secretariat, 30 July and 27 August
2003.
6 Various interviews with MEPs and EP staff, 2003 to 2004.
7 Interview with senior official of the Council Legal Service, 27 August 2003.
8 Interview with senior official of the Council Legal Service, 27 August 2003.
9 Interview with a member of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, 1 September 2003
and confirmed in other interviews with MEPs and EP staff, 2003 to 2004.
10 Interviews with a member of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee (8 July 2003) and
with a member of the secretariat of the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee (10 July
2003).
11 Interview with official of the Council secretariat, 29 August 2003.
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